THE IMPACT OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 2011 ON EGYPT'S POSITION TOWARDS THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN HAMAS AND ISRAEL

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this thesis is my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

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This research is about the impact of the Egyptian revolution 2011 on Egypt’s foreign policy towards the confrontation between Israel and Hamas. One of the most important achievements of the Egyptian revolution 2011 was the arrival of the first democratic elected President in Egypt, President Mohammad Morsi. In addition to be an elected President, Morsi came from the political Islamist group, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). These two components were considered as a dramatic political change in Egypt. The MB has its own perspective on the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. The MB does not recognize the right of Israel to exist and as well rejects the Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Nevertheless, Morsi, as the head of the MB political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), did not expose the issue of Egypt-Israel relation in his early reign. However, the Israeli aggression on Gaza in November 2012, which led to a confrontation between Israel and Hamas, obligated President Morsi to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict very early. Because of Morsi’s political and ideological stance towards Israel as well as his keenness to avoid a position similar to what Mubarak adopted on the Gaza war 2008/2009 and Morsi’s need for a popular position to enhance his domestic situation, Morsi adopted a position considered as a pro Palestinian and Hamas. The main features of the Egyptian position towards the confrontation between Israel and Hamas in November 2012 are; holding Israel responsible for the war, opening the crossings with Gaza, the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza and meeting Hamas PM, hosting Hamas leaders in Cairo during the war and backing a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel in very short time, respectively. This position was helped by a regional support came from Turkey and Qatar and by an international position represented by the US involving in the ceasefire negotiations announced by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Umer and the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. This research observes that President Morsi impacted Egypt’s position towards the confrontation between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. This position could be considered as an indication to new Egyptian foreign policy under Morsi, at least regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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