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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work in this thesis is of my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

13th July, 2011

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the continued significance of Neorealism, an International Relations theory in explaining why the UN has failed to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. This research attempts to examine why the UN, despite being a major international organization has failed to resolve the conflict by arguing that the failure of the United Nations in the conflict is influenced by the international system where the super powers (hegemons) like the US has more influence. In order to unfold this issue, this study explains the involvement of the UN in the conflict, examines the roles of the UN and its failures, and highlights the intervention role played by the US. The study uses Neorealism as a theoretical approach, including the concept of the international system and hegemony respectively, to analyze how state as the main actor, with their capability endowments, have dominated the international system. The approach has been mainly qualitative, using secondary data apart from interviews with a few individuals as key informants. As a result, this analysis adds value to existing studies in International Relations theory and the role of hegemony with respect to the case of Israel and Palestine. This study also demonstrates that state continues to be the most important actor in the international system.
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