GLOBALISATION AND REGIONALISATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING PARADIGMS

B.M. Jain

B. M. Jain is Professor and Research Scientist in Political Science, South Asia Studies Centre at the University of Rajasthan in Jaipur, India. He has written several books and articles, namely Current and Contemporary Issues and Problems in the World Order (1999), Globalised International Politics: Issues and Trends (Ed., 2001), Nuclear Politics in South Asia (1994) and Reflections on India’s Foreign Policy (1989). B. M. Jain has over six dozen articles in research journals, published both in India and internationally. Several of his own books have also been reviewed in reputable journals such as the Journal of International Affairs (London), Journal of Third World Studies (USA) and Entlungspolitik (Austria). Adding to his fine achievements, B. M. Jain has been featured in an entry in the Marquis WHO’s WHO in the World, 16th Edition, 1999.

INTRODUCTION

A major concern of this article is to construct an argument as to what an extent the process of the globalisation and regionalisation-two major contradictory and complementary trends at the moment-have altered the character, content and contours of existing theories and paradigms in the realm of international relations and foreign policy. How has transnationalism contributed to an “enduring substance”, in Brzezinski phraseology, in global politics? Has national political communities re-articulated their concerns, interest and stakes in the process of globalisation in cultural, economic and political fields? Has globalisation circumvented state-centric regimes?
In an endeavour to answer these tricky questions, it is essential to take into account both the realist and normative approaches to the understanding of the current world system, apart from examining the validity of a couple of current dominant paradigms. At the same time, we need to be alert in our attempt at offering any reinterpretation of the processes of globalisation and regionalisation in the contextual parameters of a widely shared “economicist conception” of the world system by international economic theorists, including the strategic and security communities.

In this article, I discuss briefly the nature of globalisation and regionalisation before I attempt to offer a critique of prevailing paradigms. There is a potential of “discursive conception” to support the hypothesis that after all, all international relations theories are politically community-centric while offering explanations in European, Asian, African and North American contexts. A few political pundits explain the phenomenon of international politics in terms of goals, interests and capabilities of each international player. But they do often ignore the anger and anguish of minority and marginalised political communities or groups, located in poor developing nations, over the question of transfer or distribution of resources by the rich and industrialised nations, who claim to represent their civil societies.

The purpose of this article, therefore, is to understand the foundations of international relations theory and foreign policy in the post-Cold War world given the strong currents of globalisation and regionalisation. We can suggest viable options as to how national interests need to be redefined in an information age. Joseph S. Nye of Harvard University, cryptically remarks: “Prudence alone can not determine the national interest in the information age. Better consequences will flow if interests are rationally pursued within prudent limits”.

NATURE OF GLOBALISATION

Globalisation theorists differ on a number of issues. They “focus primarily upon the world as a system and devote most of the attention to the global processes that transcend or operate more or less autonomously from individual societies or nations.” In support of their argument that globalisation has robbed individuals and societies of their autonomy, Ritzen and Malone have observed that American products such as McDonald’s are fostering of the consumption psychology and has led people to believe that state has ceased to be a “key actor” in the world system. Multinational corporations have occupied a front seat on the international platform. At the same time there are strong signals of resistance to the phenomenon of “Mcdonald-isation” at individual, societal and state levels in different parts of the world, especially
from the developing world. In these areas, there is a widely-held perception that globalisation processes in different sectors of human activities have benefited only the rich.

Though globalisation theories are still in an embryonic stage, they are broadly classified along cultural, economic, political, psychological and strategic and institutional forms. The phenomenon of globalisation is not a new one. It has undergone several phases ever since the global civilisational move through mapping out routes and crossing over territories by warriors and historians, and monks and monarchs, in search of wealth, power and knowledge. This is evident from the geographical mobility of Chinese and Persians across the lands with different missions in mind. The industrial revolution widened the network of human contacts through trade and technology. The revolution in communication and information technology has provided an added momentum to a faster movement of goods, products, technologies, capital, ideas and expertise, and, of course human beings as travelers and tourists. Vincent Wei-cheng Wang has categorised four stages of globalisation. They are: (i) the age of discovery and conquest (1492-1789), in the form of mercantilism and primitive accumulation, symbolized by Columbus’ discovery of the Americas; (ii) the age of revolution, capital and empire, (1789-1900), in the form of industrial capitalism, symbolized by the French revolution and England’s eighteenth century manufacturing revolution; (iii) the age of extremes, (1900-1970s), in the form of monopoly capitalism, symbolized by the world war I and Russia’s Bolshevik revolution, and (iv) the information age, (1970-present), in the form of globalisation (world capitalism), symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.

What is globalisation? What are its essential ingredients? There is no universally acceptable definition of globalisation. Globalization in generic terms means the abolition of geographical barriers or the “death of distance”. It means a faster movement of ideas, of technologies, of cultures and economies among nations and individuals. In this process, multinational, transnational and non-governmental organisations have played key roles in articulating the concerns and interests of the world community at large.

Globalisation has generated a lot of heated debate, especially after the end of the Cold War and demise of the Communist Soviet Union. Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times foreign affairs columnist, contends that the “globalisation system has replaced the cold War system”. Friedman explains that globalisation has contributed to the emergence of a global market place and the rise of “homogenous” global culture that is essentially “the spread of Americanization on a global scale.” According to the 1999 Human Development Report, globalisation means “global markets, global technology, global ideas and global solidarity”, enriching the lives of people
B.M. Jain

everywhere. According to the Report, the new form of globalisation involves new markets, new actors, new rules and norms and new tools of communication. Perhaps, one broadly acceptable definition of globalisation has been offered by Hans-Hendrick Holm and Georg Sorensen. According to them, globalisation refers to “the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders”. In view of the above observations, the globalisation process has changed the nature of international relations and foreign policies of members of the international community. As a distinct phenomenon, globalisation is “interregional or intercontinental in scope”. It has intensified the “levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies”. International relations theorists are grappling with the challenges that globalisation pose to nation-states in terms of autonomy, economy, human security and development. They are also observing the effects that globalisation has on the growth of civil society in radical regimes, authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Asia, and on the dynastic rule in the Gulf and Middle East.

As part of the globalisation trend, regionalisation has become a very influential phenomenon of integration among countries of a common region in economic, political, security and cultural terms to protect and promote various common interests. Growing trends of regionalism were initially a reaction to, and the desire for, economic development on the pattern of the European Economic Community (now the European Union, EU). Lately, regional trade patterns have taken different forms and have proceeded at different paces in different parts of the world. This is evident from increasing “economic protectionism” practised in Western Europe in search of a unified, stable, prosperous Europe at the cost of developing nations. Trade arrangements within the European Union are being feverishly opposed by developing nations who advocate a non-discriminatory trade regime. Notwithstanding that, regionalism has had a powerful impact on the world system in terms of trade, investment, transfer of capital-intensive technology and diplomacy.

CRITIQUE OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PARADIGMS

It is appropriate now to present a critique of some of the major international relations paradigms, in order to explain their relevance in understanding the complexity of our world system. The following are some of the important paradigms:

(i) Realist, Bipolar, Multipolar and Unipolar paradigms

(ii) Huntington’s clash of civilisations model

(iii) Primacy of economy model

(iv) Cooperative security model- Barry Buzan
(i) Realist, Bipolar, Multipolar and Unipolar Paradigms

The realist paradigm, based on power politics, is still very much relevant in understanding the contours and directions of international relations. The trademark of realism is to place an “emphasis on fear, insecurity and anarchy”. Accordingly this is reinforced by a bold power projection by the strategic coalition of the United States and Britain against the so-called “rogue states”-Iran, Libya and North Korea. Through the United Nations, the “Anglo-Saxon cousins” are employing the “stick” policy to penalise those nations who threaten American strategic, security and economic interests in the Middle East and the Gulf. The bombing of the Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO forces was an overt show of muscle flexing, totally ignoring UN principles. Without seeking a fresh mandate from the world community, the US-led forces attacked Iraq and Kosovo. Their unwarranted punitive acts were severely criticized by the world community at large, including France, Germany and Russia. On the other hand, establishment policy officials and strategic analysts justified their actions by claiming that they were maintaining international peace and security.

The realist paradigm ignores one very important dimension, that of the integrationist approach to understanding “international pluralism”. According to the integrationist theory of international relations (Karl Deutsch), the “pluralistic security community” requires international relations realists to undertake research into the integrationist approach in an international pluralistic terrain. Although this theory has not yet been fully developed, new perspectives are forming as we witness the incremental role of humanitarian intervention, based on integrationist vision. Today, in ethno-religious, ethno-political and ethno-cultural conflicts, most of sufferers are common people, many of them women and children. UN humanitarian intervention has become more clearly visible in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and India.

Given an abrupt rise in ethno-political conflicts arising from separatist movements, some scholars have posed alternative solutions to the problem of disintegration. For instance, Gidon Gottlieb observes that “most of the national and ethnic conflicts that remain today cannot be settled by changing the boundaries of States to give each national community a State of its own.” He fleshes out a non-territorial dimension of nation-state within the political autonomy framework.

Robert Jervis in his article “The Future of World Politics, Will it Resemble the Past?” lucidly argues that social scientists, with a “limited stock of knowledge” as well as the given complex nature of social realities, need to be very cautious in arriving at abrupt
conclusions. He contends that “there are few laws whose validity is uncontested”. This aptly applies to the current debate over the nature of world politics—unipolarity versus multipolarity. Different scholars have offered differing interpretations in this regard. It is commonly assumed that the bipolar world has come to an end with the end of the Cold War. It is also largely believed that the world is neither unipolar nor multipolar but it is “poly-centric”. In order to extend this academic debate further, let us put it in simple terms that we still find remnants of bipolarism along with signs and signals of both unipolarism and multipolarism. Let us discuss it briefly.

The nature of bipolarity has changed. In the bipolar world, the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were perpetually interlocked in chasing each other, either for maintaining their respective spheres of influence, or defending their client states or reducing military threats to each other through military alliance systems such as NATO (1949), SEATO (1954), CENTO(1955) and the Warsaw Pact (1955). After the demise of the Soviet Union, the “politics of chasing” has ceased to exist primarily in terms of maintaining the “spheres of influence”. Kenneth N. Waltz is also of the view that despite the end of bipolarity the latter endures at least in a military sense. How? Russia, for instance, may no longer be in a position to effect change in the structure of international politics economically, technologically and even ideologically, but it can militarily defend itself against any external threat given its overwhelming nuclear and missile capabilities. Waltz’s view on the altered character of bipolarity has a big promise and potential. Firstly, the implications of bipolarity have changed. This means the nature of the balance of power has changed. The emphasis on military powerism has shifted to economic powerism. Secondly, the containment of “military risk” has been replaced by the “containment of economic risk” following the rise of new centres of economic powers and the mushroom growth of regional economic groupings.

As regards unipolarity, there is a lot of controversy among theorists and policy practitioners. A majority of the western scholars and policy practitioners favour a unipolar world led by the United States for a number of reasons. Firstly, they argue that the post-Cold War world is more unstable and disordered in the face of serious challenges, such as international terrorism, radical fundamentalism, possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, including missile building programmes which are in the hands of “rogue states”. This warrants, according to them, an active and interventionist US role for maintaining peace and stability in the world system. This is why they justify NATO intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. This why they legitimize the air strikes by the United States and Great Britain over Iraq on the issue of the violation of the No-Fly Zone by the latter. Secondly, unipolarists argue that
given the changing nature of power in the proclaimed new world order, the United States will have to garner collective support in military and strategic terms to meet the new challenges emanating from diverse sources.16 Many western scholars and the establishment officials are of the view that the United States should pursue a vigorous foreign policy for defending its national interests and those of its coalition partners.17 They reject the view of their counterparts in the west that America stop intervening in the internal matters of other countries. They also reject their views that the US should return to isolationism. Alvin Z. Rubinstein concludes: "Isolationist evangelism is no basis for the United States foreign policy."18

The multipolar world is in the process of emerging. Its signs are clearly visible. Its principal advocates are developing nations, apart from vocal supporters such as Russia, China and India. Their main complaint is that the "proclaimed New World Order" is West-centric. The New World Order does not give due place to sovereignty, equality and equity. Multipolarists favour an equal world order opposed to a "hegemonistic" one where great powers engage in "power politics". Their hint is towards the United States and its coalitional partners. Perhaps this is one of main reasons why Russia, China and India do not subscribe to the notion of a unipolar world led by the United States and supported by its "Anglo-Saxon cousins" (see Huntington’s Clash of Civilization model, below). It implies a sort of non-equality among legally equal and sovereign states. That is why Third World nations advocate a multi-polar world based on equality and sovereignty. Be that as it may, it is essential to have a comprehensive and creative debate over the various dimensions of the new world order so that we can better grasp the nuances of globalization and regionalisation.

(ii) Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations model

World politics has entered a new phase. In Huntington’s hypothesis, "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great division among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural."19 Huntington’s notion of "clash of civilizations" has come up against sharp criticism by peace theorists and activists belonging to the West. Instead, they prefer to focus on how nations could engage each other, and concentrate on a "dialogue among civilizations", rather than a "clash".19

Huntington, in another article entitled “America a Lonely Super Power?”20 justifies the US global leadership to save the world community from total anarchy, but then later cautions America that it should desist from committing an egregious blunder by entertaining the idea of a unipolar world in view of its power limitations.
(iii) Primacy of Economy

Primacy of economy paradigm assigns singular importance to economy, finance, money, trade and investment both within the framework of WTO and regional economic groupings as a guiding force in the new international order. The European Union has a larger economy than the United States and “will act as a single actor on global economic issues to an increasing degree.” The pan-Asia caucus (East Asian Economic Caucus) mooted by Malaysia, and the Latin America’s formation of Southern Cone Common market are examples of the increasing trend towards expanding the frontiers of free trade to compete with counterpart organisations elsewhere. It does not, however, imply that bilateralism has lost its salience and significance so far as economic and trade ties between states as actors in the international system are concerned.

Realistically enough, the WTO and regional economic groupings have failed to address the real problems or contentious issues between the North and South and to provide a momentum to the meaningful economic interaction and integration between state actors. The SAARC, for instance, has not succeeded in promoting a free trade regime at the regional level, as agreed upon by member nations in several SAARC summits—New Delhi, Male and Colombo in 1995, 1997 and 1998 respectively. Only India and Sri Lanka have taken bold political initiatives at bilateral levels to proceed more comfortably towards free market access to goods and services by entering into bilateral agreements.

The gargantuan challenge that international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF poses to developing countries is how to restructure and revitalize those economies to ensure their financial stability and economic development. The US Congress pushed to set up the international Financial Institution Advisory Council in November in 1998, chaired by Allen H. Meltzer, an economist from Carnegie Melon University, in order to reinvigorate the efficacy of the international financial institutions. The Council recommended that the “proper role of the IMF should be to prevent financial crises and the spread of the crises that occur—the IMF should not tend to finance the structural reforms of the recipient countries’ institutions. The Fund should give advice, but it should not tie the advice to assistance”.

The shifting paradigm of the post-Cold War global economy in favour of multinational corporations has considerably changed the economic prism of the IFI. The latter is now a determining factor in the allocation of major funds to Third World nations. In fact, the prism reflects the powerful mirror image of private financial institutions and individuals in rich industrialised countries that “supply the largest part of capital flow to the developing world.
The international financial institutions’ share is now less than 5 percent of the total. This implies at least two things. Firstly, the increasing influence of private financial institutions as opposed to governmental aid agencies. Secondly, the increasing dependence of developing nations on the capital flows from private financial institutions. The critics of public financial institutions lash out at the in-built defects in their lending system. They argue that developing nations can repay the loans from private financial institutions but fail to repay their mounting debt to multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. It clearly implies that critics do not favour private loans to the developing world. They suggest two alternatives to this murky situation. Firstly, they advocate “risk management” strategies in advance. Secondly, they suggest that private lending institutions make it absolutely clear to poor developing nations that they would not bail them out in an economic crisis. If we recall, the IMF/World Bank undertook the “debt-relief initiative” for the 22 Heavily indebted Poor Countries (HICP).

(iv) Co-operative Security Model-Barry Buzan

Of late, a number of alternative paradigms such as “security community”, collective security, co-operative security and securitisation have been offered. As regards co-operative security, the critics argue that it cannot function effectively due to divergent threat perceptions among ruling elites belonging to different nations. Secondly, they say that geopolitical perceptions of the Cold War period are being rapidly replaced by geo-psychological perceptions. It is correct to some extent that psychic responses especially to ethno-religious conflicts/crises have assumed far more significance than ever before. This partly reinforces the premise that psychological incompatibility between decision-makers belonging to opposite poles tends to compound security problems. Thirdly, the securitisation analysts (Buzan, Waver and Wilde) talk of security within the framework of social processes. They perceive the act of securitisation “as a speech act, giving rise to the specific social consequences” (Werner, 1998).

The Copenhagen Group while advocating the importance of securitisation in a fast growing milieu of politicization stresses that unless social problems are properly addressed, a composite security is inconceivable. Without going into details about the securitisation concept, let us examine how co-operative security can be a better substitute to exiting approaches to the nuclear conflict management. What does the notion of co-operative security entail?

Co-operative security is a set of common ideals and goals, which are capable of realising what is desirable by recognising mutual necessity-political, economic, strategic, psychological and
ideological-for survival as a nation and society. If seen in this perspective, co-operative security involves transparency in intentions and motivations, common security perceptions, respect for religious and cultural differences, commitment to democratic values, non-interference in local conflicts and the political will to promote regional peace and stability.

Barry Buzan has introduced the concept of “security complex” to study regional security or what he calls “regional pattern of amity and enmity”. According to Barry Buzan, a security complex is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities can not be considered apart from one another”. Before applying this concept in the context of South Asia, let us first enumerate some of the essential conditions, which might be helpful in promoting the model of co-operative security. They include civil society; enlargement and consolidation of democratic structures and institutions; political capacity of the leadership; improvement in the cognitive maps of public policy practitioners; citizen intervention; regional economic integration; reducing the interventionist role of extra-regional forces; primacy to the resolution of outstanding bilateral problems.

To an outsider of region, a catalogue of conditions as mentioned above is likely to turn him pessimistic about the feasibility of the co-operative security model. Can one wait till civil societies take root in the South Asian region? Should one wait till democratic institutions are restored or citizen intervention in state affairs becomes a reality in restraining key decision-makers to take suicidal decisions like the deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles in the region? Of course, one need not wait till all essential conditions are fulfilled. What is required is to work simultaneously towards building the structures of co-operative security and undertaking corrective measures to strengthen institutions, which are integral part of a cohesive national fabric.

Co-operative security is to be understood in a holistic sense. In the context of South Asia, co-operative security means many things. First, it is a joint strategy to address those issues and problems, which have been causing a serious concern to all member states of the region. As said earlier, the small-big power syndrome is one of principal sources of mutual mistrust among the countries of the region. With the self-declarations by India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states, the climate of suspicion, fear and mistrust among the rest of member states has become more pronounced. To build mutual trust for the setting up of common regional security order, India and Pakistan have onerous responsibility as well as obligation to create confidence among small member states by undertaking concrete steps like signing the CTBT, FMCT and bilateral arms control agreements. Both countries, while adopting transparent
approaches, embark upon the defence-slashing programme instead of beefing up their respective defence expenditure. On strategic and security issues that impinge on the regional peace and stability, India and Pakistan need to take smaller states into confidence. For over 50 years, as we have been witnessing, India and Pakistan have scarcely taken note of the sensibilities of their small neighbours. Nor have they addressed their legitimate security concerns. On the contrary, they have divided the region in a typical fashion by behaving and acting like irresponsible regional actors. With a view to carving out their own spheres of influence within the region, both countries are engaged in drawing their neighbours into their strategic schema.

A STATE SYSTEM?

International relations theorists are divided over the question of state sovereignty in the face of the increasing internationalization (or globalisation) of politics. There are advocates as well as opponents of state systems. Opponents believe that a trend towards a more “integrated global social system” and internationalization “has eaten the abstract concept of sovereignty away. States can longer be thought of as the hard billiard balls of classical international theory.”28 To substantiate their argument they contend that state activities have been sharply constrained due to the diffusion of technology, diffusion of power and increasing economic activities at the global level, making the world inevitably interdependent.29

On the other hand, there are scholars who do not subscribe to this view. They attack their critics by arguing that states cannot be reduced to serving as “convenient instruments” of the corporate sector. In their view the state system will continue to act as a principal actor legally, socially and politically. They agree that the world has become interdependent. But the moot question is can we ignore state’s sovereign character? Kevin P. Clements of International Alert writes that state systems are “absolutely indispensable to the peace building process.” This is grounded in the logic that it is states alone that have legitimate authority to deal with counter state actors on crucial matters such as the concluding of treaties, such as for terminating a war and for concluding peace agreements. States also have legitimate authority to accredit diplomats; to exchange protocol and to sign memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and other agreements. The performance of acts can not be transferred or delegated to non-state actors.

Besides that, the role of the state in maintaining law and order has become much more crucial in the face of mounting threats of international terrorism and religious extremism. To combat or curb them, state-to-state collaboration has become inevitably more important, for instance, on the conclusion of extradition treaties.
In view of the extreme positions taken up by both sides, one needs to consider dispassionately that neither state system has lost its relevance nor the globalisation process can afford to do away with nation-state system. Both have to co-exist without undermining the importance of the other. This implies that international theorists have yet to grapple with the difficulty of building a sound and scientific theory while striking a balance between the two opposing poles of sovereignty and autonomy.î

PSYCHO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

New typologies of conflicts are on the rise, emanating from the tide of cultural nationalism and ethnic consciousness. One writer has rightly said that this is a kind of “ethnic passion”. And when it is a passion, how can we control it. In fact, an unabated rise in ethno-national, politico-religious and cultural passions after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union has created manifold problems.

The people in East European countries belonging to divergent cultural communities and ethnic groups started expressing their deep seated anguish against monolithic structures of state in the hitherto communist regimes. Their demand for political and economic autonomy as well as preservation of their cultural identity has given rise to ethno-cultural conflicts between divergent cultural groups as we witness in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

Similarly, the demand for separatism in China’s Xin-Xiang province, in Sri Lanka, Algeria, Tibet and India has contributed to ethno-religious strife of the worst kind. Moreover, the resurgence of ethnic consciousness in Rwanda between Hutus and Tutsis has resulted in a horrendous genocide. All the above instances clearly reveal that ethnic nationalism in a quest for separate nationhood has given rise to violence and bloodshed. Is there any feasible paradigm explaining both causes and remedies of ethno-political conflicts? Theoretical studies in this regard are still underway. Nevertheless, there is an increasing proliferation of such studies in the psycho-cultural field.

Proponents and advocates of the psycho-cultural paradigm argue that the root cause of ethno-cultural and ethno-political conflicts is basically psycho-cultural in nature. Minority groups in an effort to maintain their cultural identity do often come into sharp clashes with the majority in the community, attributed mainly to the psychic fear of dominant majority communities. Political elites also find it convenient to exploit their psychology along the symbols of religion, ethnicity, race, caste and creed for their narrow political ends.î It gradually fosters the psychology of fear and insecurity among minority and marginalised sections. This cycle continues to inform the cognitive process of masses including ruling elites.
International relations theorists are trying to understand this phenomenon in psychological and cultural terms. Some of them have come out with the formulations that a perceptional change is required in the fixed mindsets of ruling elites and masses, as a first essential condition for reducing the intensity of culture-based conflicts. Citizen intervention is cited as one of the most feasible modes of bringing about positive changes in the psyche of people at large.32

OPTIONS

We have limited options in the irreversible globalisation process. Globalisation has come to stay. There is no single model or paradigm in international relations that can explain the complex nature of the emerging world order. Nor is there any uncontested security model that can fit into the interconnected and interdependent world. The world at times looks like a unipolar world given the overwhelming military, technological and economic power of the United States. This is apparent because the US has been flexing its muscles in Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia and several other parts of the world. At the same time it is patently clear that America does not have unlimited power and influence to get what it desires. Huntington has warned America that it will have to pay a very heavy price if it entertains the belief that a unipolar world can be constructed. Thus, America will have to garner up support from its allies and coalition partners to shape the world order in the globalised politics, economy and culture. This also clearly hints that the world is simultaneously heading towards a multipolarity. The signs of the latter are clearly visible. For instance, Russia, China and India are strongly in favour of a multipolar world in which main attention will be given to sovereignty and equality on the basis of which international relations will be conducted. They are opposed to any kind of hegemonism and power politics. Nor do they like that the United States and its reliable coalition partners should provide global leadership. In brief, both the processes of unipolarity and multipolarity are simultaneously operating in their own ways. No body can perhaps predict the exact nature of the world system. What is important is that different paradigms can be put to a better use to manage conflicts, to create peace conditions and promote security and stability in the international order.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The current state of globalisation and regionalisation suggests that the international system is unevenly structured. Institutional financial structures both at public and private levels—WTO, World Bank, IMF, and Private Financial Institutions (PFIs)—need to be restructured to ensure human security, sustainable development and non-discriminatory trade regimes. Theories on international trade and finance have not yet produced long
term strategies for a just, fair and balanced global competition in the face of proliferating multinational enterprises. Given this, state-based political decisions and actions in developing world will continue to play a major role in the social sector despite the fact that developing nations under severe pressure from the WTO and developed world urging them to introduce faster economic reforms for foreign investment, free trade regimes and capital flow. The developing world needs to convince the rich North that fetterless capitalism and borderless globalisation must adjust to the hard boiled realities of poor developing nations.

The shift in power structure will continue to influence the international system. A mix of geo-strategic, geo-economic and geo-cultural factors are likely to propel public decision makers to fashion their countries' foreign policies and reinvent new diplomatic strategies accordingly to fit in the potential currents of globalisation and regionalisation. The issues of global governance and environment, global culture and democracy will continue to lure international theorists and policy practitioners into working out new formulations, paradigms and conceptual underpinnings.

REFERENCES


Filip Tunjic, "War and geopolitics- Really Together?", Strategic Digest (Delhi), Vol. XXV, No.1, January 2000, pp.20-34.

B.M. Jain and E.M. Hexamer, (Editors), *Nuclearisation in South Asia: Reactions and Responses* (Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat, 1999).


---

**NOTES**

1 Joseph Nye, Jr., “Redefining the National Interest”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999, p.35


6 Quoted in Vincent, Wei-cheng Wang, op.cit., p. 65.


8 Ibid.


17 Rubenstein, "In Search of a Foreign Policy, Society, September/October 1992.


19 See the IPRA papers, Tampere, Finland, August, 5-10, 2000.


23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


29 See Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism", Foreign Policy, Spring, 1995, 159-177.

