ASEAN’s Role in Promoting Regionalism and Multilateral Security in Asia

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ABSTRACT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 in the context of the Cold War. As such, the original five states (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines) came together to combat the threat of communism, preserve their independence, protect national sovereignty, and promote regional cooperation. All of these were foundational objectives. The regional entity was sufficiently resilient to deal with the challenges of the end of Cold War politics by 1990, and to chart its own course of strengthening regional cooperation, expanding its membership from five to ten, and to constructively manage the interests and engagement of the major external powers in Southeast Asia.

This article argues that ASEAN progressed from its foundational goals to build stronger bonds of regionalism in the political, economic, security and socio-cultural dimensions leading to the declaration in 2003 to establish the ASEAN Community. In the process, ASEAN has also showed that it can take the lead in promoting multilateral security in the post-Cold War era by a more inclusive approach through the ASEAN Regional Forum. It suggests that the “ASEAN Way” is a useful and relevant informal process of promoting regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The fact that all the major external powers, which are also Dialogue Partners of ASEAN, have signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), with the U.S. being the latest signatory in July 2009, is testimony to the regional association’s success in promoting regional security and multilateralism in Asia.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, ASEAN Way, regionalism, ASEAN Community, multilateral security in Asia.
INTRODUCTION
The formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 was motivated by political and security considerations during the Cold War, especially the desire to fight international communism. However, the progress of regional cooperation in the early phase was impeded by intra-regional territorial disputes. Yet, the regional statesmen were aware that they needed to take their own initiatives quite independently of the major powers, to chart their own destiny for the region. Regionalism, according to Nicholas Tarling, implies a sentiment that exists or, perhaps more often, a programme or policy designed to build on or, if need be, to create or promote such a sentiment. Among states, where it is now at least the more common usage, it may again be designed to reduce differences and expand commonalities. It may also be designed to accommodate or provide leadership from within the region or from outside (Tarling 2006: 9). This definition of regionalism also implicitly contains the notion of “empowerment” used in this study: building national and regional resilience through a collective framework, and engaging in dynamic relations with major external powers. In this sense, ASEAN’s concept of regionalism also envisions a multilateral security framework that conduces to a more stable regional order in which the interests of all parties can be better addressed and accommodated.

ORIGINS OF REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The notion of “modern Southeast Asia” as a geographical and geopolitical entity clearly has its origins in western colonialism and scholarship on the region. It gained momentum during the phase of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia as a whole during the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th century. The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1942-1945) added momentum to the nationalist struggle for ending western colonialism leading to independence in the aftermath of World War II.

The United Nations also played a part in consolidating the notion of Southeast Asia as an integral region. The United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), later renamed Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), focused development aid and international assistance to this part of the Developing World, thereby strengthening the perception of regional leaders that they shared a common history of political struggle, possessed similar socio-economic characteristics, and needed to work together to achieve development, stability and security. The Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947 helped bring together Asian statesmen to develop a common and unified agenda to speed up the process of decolonization. The first conference of Non-Aligned Nations held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 enabled Asian statesmen to express their views regarding the Cold War that had emerged, and to state their preference for neutrality, i.e. to not get involved in bloc politics that could further embroil them in the East-West rivalry between Communism and Capitalism, also known as the ideological conflict between the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union, and the Capitalist camp led by the United States. As a fierce anti-Communist superpower, the U.S. was determined to fashion a security system that could check the further expansion of Communism from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia. The stalemates in both Korea (following the armistice at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953) and Vietnam (following the Geneva Accords on Indochina in July 1954) urged the U.S. to extend its Containment Policy from Europe to Asia.

In Southeast Asia, the failure of the Geneva Accords on Indochina served as a pretext for U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, with the aim of preventing the pro-American regime in the South from falling to the Communist regime in North Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. Under U.S. sponsorship through the setting up of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on 8 September 1954, i.e. four months after the defeat of France in Indochina, the military dimension of Southeast Asian regionalism had clearly emerged. Although only two Southeast Asian states (Thailand and the Philippines) were SEATO members, the western security system was fully extended to Southeast Asia via other bilateral and multilateral alliances such as the ANZUS Pact and the US-Japan Alliance, both signed in 1951. Undoubtedly, in organising regional security for Southeast Asia, the United States was the key player in the early decades of the Cold War.
EARLY INDIGENOUS EFFORTS TOWARDS REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The newly-independent countries of Southeast Asia were fully conscious of the need to consolidate their independence. The leaders were mindful of the enormous tasks of managing an independent nation that in almost all cases, was multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural. Besides, they had to forge national development strategies to develop the rural areas and reduce the income gap between the haves and have-nots of their own populations. Additionally, they had to ensure that they were not attacked by external powers, or subverted from within through separatist rebellions and insurgencies. Thus, moving from a “state-nation” (the residue of colonialism) to a “nation-state” \(^2\) required national efforts, regional cooperation and external assistance.

The first such effort towards creating a common consciousness of Southeast Asia as having a common destiny was the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in July 1961. This was an association to promote cultural cooperation among three regional states: Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand took the lead in this effort. The leaders hoped that through cultural exchange and cooperation, they could move from the non-controversial sphere to the more sensitive and political dimensions of cooperation at a later stage.

Nevertheless, intra-regional differences and tensions continued to persist due to differences in ideological perspectives regarding the post-colonial order in Southeast Asia. The Confrontation Policy by Indonesia against Malaysia was launched by the Indonesian leader as he was unhappy with the proposed Federation of Malaysia incorporating two British-controlled territories (Sabah and Sarawak) located on the island of Borneo and sharing a common border with Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). Sukarno claimed that the new Federation of Malaysia was a plot by ‘British colonial masters’ to maintain their influence in Asia. However, in an effort to reconcile differences, the idea of a Greater Malay Confederation called MAPHILINDO, comprising Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, was mooted by Manila in early 1963.
This association proved to be an abortive one, as Sukarno did not back down on crushing Malaysia, while the Philippines laid claim to Sabah. Konfrontasi ended with the overthrow of President Sukarno in an abortive coup led by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) on 30 September 1965.

THE FORMATION OF ASEAN: INITIAL STEPS IN FORGING REGIONAL COOPERATION

The end of Indonesian Confrontation and regime change in Jakarta were critical intra-regional factors supporting the birth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967. The Bangkok Declaration was signed by the five foreign ministers from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In order to assess the significance of ASEAN’s birth and development, it is useful here to mention briefly the aims and purposes of the Association as set out in the Bangkok Declaration: (1) To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; (2) To promote regional peace and stability through respect for the rule of law and observance of the United Nations Charter; (3) To promote active collaboration and provide mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; (4) To collaborate more effectively in agriculture, industry, commodity trade, transport and communication; (5) To promote South-East Asian studies; and (6) To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

ASEAN’s socio-economic goals were more explicitly stated whereas the political and strategic goals were implicit in the sense that ASEAN was essentially a grouping of five anti-communist states. Also by 1967, it became evident to the ASEAN leaders that the United States was not going to remain forever in Southeast Asia to shoulder the entire military burden of fighting international communism. The regional states would have to eventually fend for themselves by assuming the primary responsibility of defence, although the U.S. could provide military and economic assistance. Even as early as 1967, President Nixon linked the future security of Southeast Asia with the
prospects for rapprochement with China to the ability of non-Communist Asian nations to defend themselves against Chinese aggression (Nixon 1967: 123). This was the main thesis of the Nixon Doctrine, which was announced just two years later in Guam in 1969.

The so-called Guam Doctrine undoubtedly provided additional incentives to the ASEAN leaders to formulate political, economic, social and defence strategies in the wake of both the British withdrawal ‘east of Suez’ and the impending American military withdrawal from Indochina. The regional statesmen were equally aware that for ASEAN regionalism to succeed, they needed to adopt an equidistant policy towards both the western and communist worlds. Antagonising either camp would be counter-productive, but finding common ground that could invite external engagement and cooperation for mutual benefit would be the most appropriate foreign policy strategy of survival for this fledgling organisation.

THE ZOPFAN DECLARATION: BUILDING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE

In the first five years of ASEAN’s existence, the region had to deal with bilateral territorial disputes and a regional conflict, namely the Vietnam War, in which external powers were involved. While ASEAN was generally pro-western in strategic orientation, this did not curb the regional body from gradually developing a posture of neutrality in big power rivalries. Regional members such as Malaysia were keen to prevent the region from becoming an arena for major power contestations at the expense of the local states. Individual ASEAN states entertained concerns about pressures from the big powers especially from the Soviet Union and China in light of the impending American military withdrawal from Vietnam. Indonesia, for instance feared China in view of Beijing’s apparent support for the coup led by the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI).

ASEAN and especially Malaysia was pushing its political agenda for adopting the concept of ZOPFAN or Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. This zone required the blessing of the three major powers — USA, China and
the Soviet Union — who in turn would guarantee Southeast Asia’s neutrality in Cold War politics. Malaysian foreign policy in the closing years of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s premiership (1957-1970) was moving strongly in the direction of non-alignment; an initiative that won formal recognition when the country was admitted to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1969. Arguably, ZOPFAN could be interpreted as an advance from the Bangkok Declaration, as this regional concept emphasised respect for members’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, and avoidance of any activities that could threaten the national security of any member-state. Nevertheless, ASEAN was equally mindful that foreign (i.e. western) bases were still present on ASEAN soil (in four of the five countries with exception of Indonesia) but with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned.

For ASEAN, the first five years of nation-building also coincided with the task of region-building, with the one process seemingly complementing the other. The concept of ‘national resilience’ was primarily an Indonesian idea, authored by President Suharto. The idea accorded well with other member-states, as it was non-threatening, while at the same time exhorting regional initiatives for regional order and cooperation (Palmer and Reckford 1987: 14). ZOPFAN was premised on a system of peace among the regional states, freedom in their individual advancement of national goals, and neutrality in the ongoing superpower rivalries and conflicts.

THE “ASEAN WAY”: MOVING FROM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION (BALI CONCORD I) TO THE IDEA OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY (BALI CONCORD II)

The five ASEAN leaders who signed the Bali Treaty in 1976 (also known as Bali Concord I) were: President Suharto of Indonesia, Prime Minister Hussein Onn of Malaysia, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand, and President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. Ideologically, all five leaders were anti-communist, desired “a non-confrontational regional environment, greater predictability in interstate relations, and conflict-mitigation without indulging in any sovereignty trade-off” (Sridharan 2007: 119). The Bali Concord I reflected a broad
agreement and consensus on a number of issues, including: (a) the need to strengthen national and regional resilience and regional identity eventually leading to the creation of an ASEAN community; (b) support for ZOPFAN; (c) reliance exclusively on peaceful settlement of intra-regional disputes; (d) enhancing cooperation especially in the political economic, social, scientific and technological fields; and (e) establishing mechanisms for dealing with natural disasters, food and energy security, strengthening industrial cooperation, expanding trade, and cooperation to ensure international price stability for commodity exports.

The ASEAN-5 have always remained mindful of their individual national sovereignty, and the need to jealously guard their independence and freedom of action, especially so in managing domestic issues. Their sensitivities pertaining to national sovereignty and territorial integrity were incorporated under Article 2 of TAC, which outlined the principles of political cooperation, namely: (a) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (b) the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; (c) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (d) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; (e) renunciation of the threat or use of force; and (f) effective cooperation among themselves.

THE ASEAN WAY: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

The “ASEAN Way” can be described as a strategic formula developed by the member states, and based on the regional cultures, traditions and diplomacy for interacting with neighbours to resolve differences. This should, ideally, occur without, as far as possible, resorting to force (Irwine 1983: 11-12). Indeed, TAC is a non-aggression pact containing principles that underscore the very essence of ASEAN’s strategic culture. The principles, values, processes and procedures underpinning the “ASEAN Way” may be stated as follows: (a) informality, (b) loose arrangements, (c) reliance on personal relations, (d) preference for gradualism and incrementalism, (e) aversion to legal, binding
agreements, (f) decision-making by consensus, (g) sovereign equality of
member-states, (h) avoidance of confrontational diplomacy, and (i) dialogue
to manage conflict. The “ASEAN Way” has been studied by regional specialists
with the purpose of extracting its basic essence and to get behind the thinking
of ASEAN leaders when they are confronted with contentious issues.

In theory, as well as principle, this approach demonstrates sophistication
in intra-regional problem-solving and diplomacy. In practice, however, the
machinery has proven to be inadequate in resolving key bilateral issues, such
as territorial claims between Malaysia and Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan
islands, and between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca (Pulau Batuh
Puteh). However, in order not to disrupt the consensus-based approach of
problem solving, the two territorial issues were referred to the international
Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for final resolution.

In the case of Sipadan and Ligitan, the ICJ delivered its judgment on
17 December 2002 in favour of Malaysia on the basis of the “effective
occupation” displayed by the latter’s predecessor (Malaysia’s former colonial
power, the United Kingdom) and the absence of any other superior title.5
With regard to the Malaysia-Singapore sovereignty dispute over Pulau Batu
Puteh, the ICJ on 23 May 2008 ruled 12-4 that Pedra Branca is under
Singapore’s sovereignty.6 While the above two cases indicate that ASEAN’s
dispute settlement mechanisms remain rudimentary, they also suggest that
neither party was willing to undermine the consensus formula by pressing
into service the machinery of the High Council.

The ASEAN framework of political and security cooperation was put to the
test almost immediately after the Bali Treaty. Persistent military clashes on
the Vietnamese-Cambodian border between 1976 and 1978 eventually led
to Hanoi’s decision to oust the Pol Pot regime of Democratic Kampuchea in
December 1978, and install the pro-Hanoi People’s Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) government led initially by Heng Samrin, and later by Hun Sen.
However, this outright military invasion and occupation of a country bordering ASEAN was unacceptable to the regional association, as direct security interests were involved. Hanoi’s “aggression” was viewed by the regional association as a violation of the principle of non-interference (Leifer 1989: 14). Thailand, as the “frontline state”, felt threatened by Vietnamese power, and therefore called on ASEAN to adopt a common stand to condemn Vietnam’s aggression in Cambodia. In the “ASEAN Way”, although the other members were less directly threatened by the eruption of the Cambodian conflict in 1979, they allowed Bangkok to set the political tone on Cambodia. The ASEAN formula for conflict management in this case involved several key elements that took into account the geopolitical, cultural, historical, and socio-economic complexities of the Southeast Asian regional environment. For ASEAN, any final solution or settlement must obviously be one that: (a) does not reward aggression, (b) does not threaten the post-independence territorial status quo of the regional states, (c) does not provide opportunity for major external powers to expand their intervention or involvement, (d) does not compromise Cambodian independence, and (e) creates and strengthens regional processes that support ASEAN’s model of regionalism (Nathan 1991). Furthermore, ASEAN could not be a passive participant in the Cambodian conflict in the wake of the massive outflow of Indochinese refugees, especially into Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in the aftermath of Vietnam’s invasion (Antolik 1990: 33).

ASEAN was aware that its own pressure on Vietnam would not suffice to end the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which also in some ways indicates the limits of the ASEAN Way. ASEAN therefore internationalised the issue by articulating its position at the July 1981 UN International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK). ASEAN’s position was reflected in the annual UN General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force to ensure law and order, and UN supervised elections to form a new government in post-conflict Cambodia (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 88). Additionally, Malaysia hosted the anti-Heng Samrin factions led by Prince Sihanouk, and helped establish the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June 1982. Nevertheless, in the final analysis it was the intervention of
the P5 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council) that brought sufficient pressure on Soviet-backed Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and allow for a political solution.

EXPANDING ECONOMIC COOPERATION THE “ASEAN WAY”

The 1976 Bali Summit set the tone for ASEAN economic cooperation. ASEAN’s gradualist approach to regionalism was clearly informed by several considerations, including vast disparities in the economies of member countries in terms of size, structure, orientation, resource base, and stages of economic development (Wong 2003: 190). Thus, a year later after the Bali Summit, ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Manila and signed the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements on 24 February 1977. The ASEAN PTA is an arrangement entered into by the ASEAN Member Countries to offer preferential tariff treatment to products originating from ASEAN states. Under this arrangement, an ASEAN-based importer will pay a lower tariff rate on a product if it originated from another ASEAN Member Country than if the same product were obtained from a non-ASEAN source.

The Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) were to be applied to basic commodities, particularly rice and crude oil, products of the ASEAN industrial projects, products for the expansion of intra-ASEAN trade, and other products of interest to Contracting States. However, tariff reductions, especially on goods considered sensitive or competitive were slow in coming, and goods that enjoyed tariff reductions had low trade value. As a result, intra-ASEAN trade even by 1997 comprised only 21.3 per cent of total ASEAN trade, whereas intra-EU trade comprised 60 per cent of the total trade of the European Union (Lim 2001: 212).

The ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) scheme was rather hastily adopted after the Bali Summit, and done so without proper feasibility studies having been carried out, or careful deliberation having taken place. The five ASEAN Members were each allocated an industrial project: (1) A urea project in Indonesia and Malaysia, (2) a rock Salt-Soda Ash Project in Thailand, (3) a phosphate fertiliser project in the Philippines, and (4) a diesel engine project
in Singapore. However, the AIPs suffered from several factors, including the lack of economic complementarities, and severe bureaucratic and technical problems. Eventually, except for the urea projects in Indonesia and Malaysia, the rest of the AIPs were abandoned (Lim 2001: 186-188).

The creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was announced at the Singapore Summit in 1992, was to promote intra-regional trade liberalisation, but to do so without affecting trade between ASEAN and the outside world (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 121). The AFTA scheme, which commenced in 1993, was complemented by the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme implemented in 1994. However, the exclusion of the automobile industry from both schemes suggested that protectionism was still strong in intra-ASEAN trade, thereby negatively affecting trade liberalisation, and also annoying most non-ASEAN economies (Fumio 1999: 40). Other cooperation schemes such as the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) and its successor, the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO, adopted in 1996) were intended to stimulate intra-regional and extra-regional investment in ASEAN projects. While these efforts showed greater political will, and healthier government-business cooperation, progress towards closer economic integration was indeed very gradual, typifying the step-by-step approach to Southeast Asian regionalism via the “ASEAN Way”. It is due to this realistic approach that ASEAN leaders inserted that “ASEAN Minus X” formula in the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, which they signed in Singapore:

*All Members shall participate in intra ASEAN economic arrangements. However, in the implementation of these economic arrangements, two or more Member States may proceed first if other Member States are not ready to implement these arrangements (Severino 2006: 31).*

**RESPONDING TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS**

ASEAN’s political and economic confidence was shaken when the Asian Financial Crisis erupted in mid-1997. The major problems faced by ASEAN as a result of the financial crisis were a massive private sector debt and a credit...
crunch, sharp declines in economic production, and high unemployment, inflation, labour migration, rising social problems and political unrest (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 204). Adding to these problems were ecological disasters caused by the Indonesian haze, the targeting of ethnic minorities in the wake of the economic crisis, and rising public consciousness regarding human rights and democratization (Sridharan 2007: 157). The immediate political fallout in Indonesia was the fall from power of President Suharto (May 1998), following Suharto’s humiliating acceptance of the IMF rescue package of USD40 billion in exchange for drastic economic reforms; a scene that clearly inflamed the nationalist sentiments of Indonesians (Mydans 1998).

In Malaysia, the 1997 financial crisis brought to a head differences between Prime Minister Mahathir and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim (who was eventually sacked on 2 September 1998), particularly over how the crisis should be managed. Anwar, who was also the Finance Minister, allowed interest rates to float upwards while also refusing to bail out Malaysian companies. Mahathir, on the other hand, preferred capital controls, as he blamed the crisis on foreign currency speculators and hedge fund managers (Loh 2008: 63).

ASEAN’s response to the regional economic crisis was to adopt measures that would prevent a recurrence of the financial crisis. In October 1998, the ASEAN Finance Ministers established a framework for closer consultations and better coordination of economic policies known as the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). Annual peer reviews were aimed at introducing measures to stimulate domestic demand, maintain prudent fiscal management, and expedite bank and corporate restructuring. The ASP was implemented via two coordinating mechanisms: the ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting. Additionally, ASEAN proposed utilisation of the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, South Korea) framework to establish a regional financing arrangement that would encourage bilateral swapping of local currencies to provide temporary financing to members faced with balance of payments difficulties. This effort was eventually institutionalised at the 2nd ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting (at Chiang Mai, Thailand on 6 May 2000), and became known as the Chiang Mai initiative (McDougall 2007: 37). In undertaking the above measures to avert another similar crisis, it can be argued that the regional association had gone beyond the “ASEAN Way”.
THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY

The inadequacy of regional security frameworks to cope with a post-Cold War situation was to some extent alleviated by the expansion of the ASEAN-PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference) mechanism into the ARF, which was officially inaugurated in Bangkok in July 1994. The ARF currently comprises 27 countries: the ten ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), ASEAN’s ten dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the United States), and Papua New Guinea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

The ARF is a security dialogue inviting and engaging all interested and involved participants to express and moderate their security concerns. It includes all the key Asian and Pacific actors: China, India, Russia, United States, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN. As a non-threatening mechanism, or security framework whose agenda for discussion is set by ASEAN, it is a confidence-building measure (CBM), in the sense that the security dialogue rests firmly on a foundation of economic and political consultations via the ASEAN-PMC, and builds on this foundation of promise and performance. The ARF is thus a loose structure of major and minor powers brought together by strategic circumstances accompanying a major imperial collapse and the demise of cold war confrontations. The ARF espouses all the fundamental principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) signed at its first summit in Bali in 1976, as stipulated in Article 2 of TAC. The establishment of the ARF marked a tremendous diplomatic achievement for the association, as this multilateral security forum “was premised on the engagement rather than the exclusion of major regional states by Southeast Asian States” (Haacke 2006: 135).

The ARF’s approach to conflict management or multilateral security is based on a three-stage process: (1) promotion of confidence building measures (CBMs), (2) development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and (3) development of conflict resolution mechanisms. The ARF, as presently constituted, is clearly not intended to serve as a formal multilateral security structure. In this regard, it in no way approximates the OSCE (Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) structure, whose role and relevance have increased since the end of the Cold War. For instance, since 1994 the OSCE has supervised democratic elections, promoted respect for human rights in new laws and constitutions, and negotiated and monitored cease-fires throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. By comparison, the ARF is at best “a means of encouraging the evolution of a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations between major powers with interests in the region” (Ali 2007: 21). For instance, in the Spratlys dispute, where there are overlapping territorial claims, Beijing has thus far settled for conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution, preferring bilateral, rather than multilateral, discussions on the South China Sea (Emmers 2007: 7). Nevertheless, Heller notes that although the ARF’s direct influence on any of the region’s urgent conflicts, namely Taiwan, Korea and the South China Sea, is not evident, the regional forum has “indirect influence on conflicts by ameliorating the overall regional atmosphere, by improving mutual understanding among actors, by stabilising cooperative norms, and by increasing regional transparency” (Heller 2005: 138). For ASEAN, the ARF represents yet another, wider level of security cooperation based on the ASEAN experience of bilateral defence cooperation among member-states.

**THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: TOWARDS INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL EMPOWERMENT**

The concept of “One Southeast Asia”, although not explicitly stated, was implied in the ASEAN Vision 2020 plan, adopted by the ASEAN leaders on the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN. They agreed on a shared vision of ASEAN as “a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies”. The 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003 was an important and path-breaking meeting, for it was one in which the ASEAN encompassing the geographical region of Southeast Asia. The declaration known as Bali Concord II therefore set the stage for the creation of the ASEAN Community by 2020, encompassing three key elements: security, economy, and the socio-cultural sphere. Indeed, the political need for regional identity and empowerment was given higher
priority than meeting eligibility criteria set by the Association, as the former socialist states of Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), together with Myanmar, were not yet ready to be admitted in the mid-late 1990s on the basis of their economic, social and even political record. But it can be argued that this is precisely the ASEAN way of building regional identity and consolidating regionalism in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN Security Community (ASC)

The ASC has evolved out of almost four decades of political and security cooperation, i.e. building on past challenges and successes and moving to a higher level of political-security cooperation based on the consent of member-states. It can be argued that the foundations of the ASEAN Security Community rest on the principles of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration creating ASEAN, the 1976 Bali Declaration (Bali Concord I) enumerating the TAC principles, and the 1977 Kuala Lumpur Declaration creating ZOPFAN. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994), and the 1995 Bangkok Declaration urging recognition of Southeast Asia as Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEA-NWFZ), indicated ASEAN’s response to the emerging post-Cold War security environment in Asia. Under Bali Concord II, the ASC comprises four important elements that would enable progress towards a security community: norm-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace-building. In this sense, Caballero-Anthony argues that the regional body could be charting a course in Southeast Asian regionalism that goes beyond the ASEAN Way (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 268). More importantly, ASEAN’s strategy of empowerment requires that it remains the driving force of regional and multilateral security. For Acharya, who subscribes to the constructivist school of international relations, the ASEAN Security Community has a sociological foundation in the sense that the shaping and sharing of norms by the member states facilitates a better understanding of ASEAN’s perception of, and role in regional order that is quite different from the realist notion of power politics (Acharya 2001: 8).

The implementation of ASC began in 2006, with the First ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. The inaugural ADMM was a historic occasion, and a significant milestone
in regional security cooperation, as it marked the beginning of a formal ASEAN defence track.\textsuperscript{13} The ADMM is expected to facilitate greater dialogue and practical cooperation among ASEAN defence establishments to address transnational security challenges.\textsuperscript{14} The 3\textsuperscript{rd} ADMM in Pattaya, Thailand (25-27 February 2009) was particularly significant in laying out an action plan for using ASEAN’s military assets and capacities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), with the aim of accelerating ASEAN militaries’ operational effectiveness in HADR.\textsuperscript{15} All these measures do suggest the gradual strengthening of political will to go beyond the “ASEAN Way” in addressing post-Cold War problems, challenges and opportunities in the security realm.

\textit{ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)}

Regional economic cooperation, like political and security cooperation, has also developed over time from the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) in the late 1970s, to the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) and ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) scheme in the 1980s. They represent gradual stages, leading to the decision for further trade liberalisation in 1992 to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2003. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in the 1990s and beyond reflect attempts by the regional entity to incorporate greater private sector participation and also promote economic integration within Members and Dialogue Partners.

The AEC’s integration agenda include: (a) reducing the “development gap” between 1\textsuperscript{st} tier (the original five member states plus Brunei) and 2\textsuperscript{nd} tier members (CLMV countries),\textsuperscript{16} (b) human resources development and capacity building; (c) closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; (d) enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; (e) integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and (f) enhancing private sector involvement. At the 12\textsuperscript{th} ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007, the leaders undertook to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 along the lines of ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, in the three pillars: ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.\textsuperscript{17}
Nevertheless, the track record of economic integration indicates some major challenges confronting the regional grouping. For instance, there is the “integration gap” between the original ASEAN-5 and the CLVM countries, besides Myanmar’s reluctance to undertake reforms toward political accommodation and democratization. In any case, ASEAN’s conception of empowerment accords greater priority to the creation of a regional identity, thereby in the process exhorting patience and tolerance of disparity and diversity in proceeding on the slow and perhaps sluggish path of regional integration. As Severino observes, “ASEAN’s response to the ‘two-tier’ problem is not to keep out the weaker economies of Southeast Asia but to bring them in, seek to integrate them in ASEAN, and help close the development gap between them and the older members”. 18

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)

This third dimension of the ASEAN Community has its roots in an earlier epoch of social and cultural cooperation, when, in 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was set up to promote cultural exchange. The establishment of ASEAN facilitated functional cooperation in the socio-cultural dimension as well. Bali Concord II (2003) therefore endorsed the ASCC Plan of Action for creating a Community of ‘Caring Societies’, raising standard of living of disadvantaged groups, and investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. It also aimed to intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including the prevention and control of infectious diseases, and joint action to deal with trans-boundary haze and pollution as well as disaster management. 19

Significantly, Article 1, paragraph 7 of the ASEAN Charter states that the purposes of ASEAN are: “To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member states of ASEAN” (Koh, Manalo and Woon 2009: 169). The ASCC Plan of Action has put together a comprehensive list of social sectors that require attention and action in the context of regional integration. However, dealing with social issues at the regional level is not always the
most feasible, or most effective, approach, as it is almost impossible to find one policy that suits all member states.

In the context of ASEAN, there are no supranational institutions to mandate region-based action. Hence, since many issues in the social sector are ultimately national responsibilities, regional action on a particular area works only if the national and regional agendas are aligned.\textsuperscript{20} On the positive side, despite existing implementation and coordination problems at the governmental and inter-governmental levels, the ASCC framework encourages participation by civil society to realise its goals. For instance, the first meeting of the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), with the aim of engaging ASEAN and civil society, was convened even before Bali Concord II. That inaugural meeting (held in Batam, Indonesia on 24-25 November 2000) brought together about 300 representatives of NGOs, grassroots leaders and activists, think tanks and businesses, discussing a wide range of issues that were critical to ASEAN’s relevance, including the impact of globalisation, poverty alleviation, environmental management, women’s empowerment and human rights. APA has formalised its conventions every two years, with the third APA convening in Manila on 25-27 September 2003 to deliberate on the third pillar of the ASEAN Community, “Towards an ASEAN Community of Caring Societies”. Thus, APA has emerged as a very useful forum for engaging ASEAN Governments in promoting human development and security (Caballero-Anthony 2005: 251).

ASEAN AND THE MAJOR POWERS

The major external powers with whom ASEAN has also established a dialogue relationship, recognise the growing importance of ASEAN’s role in maintaining regional security, stability and development. The major Dialogue Partners which are significant to ASEAN regionalism, especially in the post-Cold War era, are the United States, Japan, the European Union, China, and India. United States’ policy towards Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole encompasses: (a) further improving regional cooperation to complement its existing bilateral security alliances, (b) ensuring and promoting continued prosperity, and (c) engaging the rising Asian powers to resolve major international issues
ASEAN recognised the U.S. as a Dialogue Partner in 1977 in the hope of boosting American trade and investment in the region. Economically, the U.S. continues to be the key export market for the ASEAN countries, but its importance has been falling as China’s has been increasing. The U.S. exports USD50 billion in goods to ASEAN per year, while U.S. private-sector investment in ASEAN exceeds USD80 billion, surpassing U.S. investments in each of China, Japan, and India (Lohman 2007). Washington has also negotiated a Trade and Investment Framework (TIFA) with ASEAN and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Singapore, and has begun FTA negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand. In the political-security dimension, U.S. endorsement of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) at the Annual Ministerial Meeting in Phuket, Thailand (22 July 2009) signals America’s interest in being actively engaged in Southeast Asia at a time when China’s and also India’s stakes are rising in ASEAN. U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, believes that with American accession to the treaty, the U.S. will continue to have a strong relationship with Southeast Asia as well as an enduring presence based on mutuality and partnership.

Japan has played a very important role in promoting regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, especially in the early stages of ASEAN’s formation and development. Japan became a formal Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1977. Tokyo gave vast amounts of economic aid under the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme to ASEAN countries. When the Indochinese countries (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) joined ASEAN between 1995 and 1999, Japan provided substantial economic assistance for their reconstruction. In Cambodia, in particular, Japan’s influential role in Southeast Asia was evidenced by its participation in UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), helping with peace-keeping operations and the organisation of democratic elections to establish a post-conflict Government in Cambodia.

As both ASEAN and the EU have a shared common interest in “promoting peace, stability and enduring prosperity in their regions”, the EU and ASEAN have formed an inter-regional partnership (Vogel 2006). The EU has been able to provide and enhance the ‘soft security’ of the Asian region by “passing
on its expertise in implementing cross-border security measures against clandestine labour migration, drugs and arms smuggling, piracy and money laundering” (Berkofsky 2003). The ARF has also been used as a forum to set up exchanges between Asian and European police forces.

ASEAN is also extremely important to China, because the latter can promote multi-polarity through ASEAN (Kuik 2005: 117). China’s strong interest in ASEAN stems from the role of this regional organisation in helping China to preserve a stable external environment that conduces to internal modernization and economic growth. This motivation is particularly evident in the way Beijing has handled the contending territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing has proposed “shelving the dispute and developing together” (Kuik 2005: 117). To assuage ASEAN’s concerns in the economic domain, China has granted ASEAN access to its market earlier than other WTO members, encouraged Chinese firms to invest in Southeast Asia, and provided financial aid for ASEAN’s infrastructure development. ASEAN’s trade with China has grown significantly since 2000 to the point where China is now the third largest trading partner of ASEAN after Japan and EU, with the U.S. falling into fourth place in 2008 (Table 1). In the regional security dimension too, China has shown a willingness to work with ASEAN over the disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea. ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, pledging not to use force to protect their interests in this resource-rich maritime region.

India’s “rapprochement” with ASEAN in the 1990s came in the context of China’s rise as the improvement in relations after the Cold War provided ASEAN with a diplomatic option vis-à-vis China and created “a major opening for India in Southeast and East Asia” (Devare 2006: 23). The ASEAN-India bilateral relationship has grown ever since the end of the Cold War and the economic opening of India under former Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, who is also the current Prime Minister. During the Cold War, ASEAN’s relations with India were not cordial, as New Delhi adopted a pro-Soviet stance on regional and international security issues, including
Table I: ASEAN Trade by Selected Partner Country/Region, 2008 (in US million; share in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trade Partner/Country</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Share to Total ASEAN Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>242,497.5</td>
<td>215,616.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>104,861.6</td>
<td>107,053.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union (EU-25)</td>
<td>112,886.8</td>
<td>89,471.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>85,557.7</td>
<td>107,114.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>101,128.5</td>
<td>79,910.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>34,938.6</td>
<td>40,541.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>33,681.3</td>
<td>17,907.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>30,085.8</td>
<td>17,379.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,416.9</td>
<td>5,128.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,706.7</td>
<td>6,913.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4,161.3</td>
<td>3,263.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4,386.3</td>
<td>457.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total selected partner</td>
<td>762,309.1</td>
<td>690,757.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries/regions</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>116,942.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ASEAN</td>
<td><strong>879,251.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>831,169.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

according recognition to the pro-Hanoi People’s Republic of Kampuchea (Anand 2009: 1). But since the end of the Cold War, the rise of India (especially in the area of Information and Communication Technology [ICT]) created opportunities for a closer ASEAN-India engagement. ASEAN was also concerned about being overwhelmed by China in Southeast Asia. In this regard, India fits into ASEAN’s strategy of balancing big powers (Strange, 1996). Among the ASEAN states, Singapore was more active in promoting India’s membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, ensuring New Delhi’s admission as a Dialogue Partner, and supporting the creation of an ASEAN-India FTA (Sekhar 2007). ASEAN is presently India’s fourth-largest trading partner after the European Union, United States and China.

ASEAN’s relations with the major external powers, including its Dialogue Partners, are motivated by the need to protect national sovereignty and strengthen regional identity. As ASEAN gained in confidence, it began to empower itself by expanding political, economic and security cooperation with its external partners, all of whom contribute substantially to ASEAN’s total trade. By engaging with Dialogue Partners, ASEAN has also been able to neutralise excessive external influence or interference from any one source. Through the ARF, the regional body has demonstrated its unique capacity to mediate the relations between the big and small powers in the region. The progress made by the ASEAN nations can be attributed to the association’s determination to be the driving force of regional cooperation and multilateral security in Asia.

ASEAN’s way of strengthening regional community is to focus on Development Cooperation with dialogue partners by ensuring their positive engagement in two critical areas: (a) strengthening economic cooperation and supporting ASEAN’s integration, including the narrowing of development gaps through physical interconnections and capacity-building; and (b) enlisting their cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including terrorism, environmental pollution and disaster management. ASEAN and its dialogue partners are increasingly using the dialogue process to strengthen mechanisms for enhancing economic linkages to tap each others’ markets, facilitate
investment flows, and promote tourism and other economic activities. Thus, ASEAN’s approach to community is aimed at promoting convergence of intra-regional and extra-regional efforts to boost regional security, economic development, and socio-cultural progress.

CONCLUSION
ASEAN’s record of regional cooperation over the past four decades indicates that the process of integration and community-building has been informed by local initiatives, history, tradition, political economy and the strategic culture of the region. The original five members of the association (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines) faced many challenges to community-formation during the Cold War era. They had to deal with communist threat, preserve independence, protect national sovereignty, and promote regional cooperation — these being the foundational goals of ASEAN. In doing so, the ASEAN states were initially guided by the desire for survival as nation-states, and to forge regional cooperation on an incremental basis by moving from the less controversial areas of social and cultural cooperation to the more challenging tasks of political, economic and security cooperation. ASEAN leaders had long been aware that they were confronted by the “deep ideational conflicts, residual cold war divisions, by memories of war and occupation, vastly different levels of development among component member states, radically different indigenous models of political economy, and by the ambitions of competing regional powers” (Breslin, Higgot and Rosamond 2002). They also had to mediate in big power relations with Southeast Asia.

The year 1976 marked an important watershed in ASEAN regionalism as the Bali Summit created and endorsed a document called the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). This was basically a non-aggression pact, and a very important milestone in the development of norms that would evolve into the ASEAN Community three decades later. In the post-Vietnam era, ASEAN sought the support of external powers to guarantee regional stability by urging them to recognise ZOPFAN. ASEAN also expressed concerns about renewed military conflict when the Third Indochina War erupted following Vietnam’s
invasion of Cambodia. Two ASEAN leaders in particular, Prime Minister Hussein Onn of Malaysia and President Suharto of Indonesia, enunciated the Kuantan formula in 1980 urging superpower restraint while allowing the regional states to resolve what ASEAN considered was a regional conflict.

Economic integration in a region with ideological and political actors in Southeast Asia is obviously no easy process, given also the mutual suspicions that existed in post-colonial societies whose leaderships had the responsibility of transforming “state-nations” into “nation-states”, but doing so without this process can cause internal disintegration or regional instability. In the realm of economic cooperation, ASEAN has progressed gradually from the Preferential Trading Arrangements of the 1970s to industrial cooperation in the 1980s, to the creation of AFTA in the early 1990s, and, finally, to closer integration via the ASEAN Community and the ASEAN Charter in the first decade of the 21st century. According to Rodolfo Severino, who was Secretary-General of ASEAN from 1998-2002, the ASEAN Charter represents the culmination of ASEAN’s integrative approach, but with the caveat that “anything ASEAN does or becomes is the result of negotiations and common decisions by the member-states” (Severino 2008: 109).

In the era of Globalization, and following the demise of bipolarity, the ASEAN states have demonstrated political will in addressing traditional and non-traditional security issues by employing multilateral diplomacy, notably in the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Despite the many challenges in managing multilateral security via an ASEAN-driven ARF (such as the contending claims in the Spratlys), the regional body’s external partners (including all of its Dialogue Partners) are generally willing to accept ASEAN’s three-stage process of confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict-resolution (Severino 2006: 192). Through the ARF, and also the dialogue-partner mechanism (as described in Chapter Four), ASEAN has emerged as interlocutor in big power relations, and has to date demonstrated a remarkable ability to mediate in the complex power relationships existing in the Asia-Pacific region, but doing so without seriously undermining the national or regional interests of all parties concerned. The skillful diplomacy engineered by ASEAN in this regard has in no small measure contributed to
the stability, development and security of the region. Through the ASEAN machinery, and notably the ARF, the region’s states, working in cooperation with the major powers, are moving towards jointly addressing major security challenges, as well as countering non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters, international terrorism and climate change in the years to come.

The late 20th and the early 21st centuries are witnessing the rise of China and India; two Asian giants that are gradually displacing the U.S. as the primary consumer of goods from Asia (Tan 2009). ASEAN has attempted to accommodate their ambitions, economic energies and technological prowess by signing Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with these two rising powers. Instead of viewing China as a threat, ASEAN preferred to see a rising China and India as an opportunity to expand economic cooperation. The recent U.S endorsement of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation could well suggest that ASEAN is no longer a faceless entity, but a rising international actor capable of contributing to the recovery of the current global financial crisis (Chonkittovorn 2009). The US endorsement of ASEAN’s TAC signifies not only Washington’s desire to engage more deeply with the region and help ASEAN achieve its global and international aspirations, but also the regional association’s diplomatic success in securing greater cooperation from the world’s superpower to support ASEAN’s approach to regional security. Additionally, Nye argues that while hard power remains crucial in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution (Nye 2003: 17). The Obama Administration’s approach to Asia based on using less coercion and more consensuses would arguably strengthen U.S-ASEAN relations.

The challenges of globalisation oblige any regional organisation to deal with a multiplicity of issues on a daily basis, including regional security, migrant workers, human resource development and transportation linkages. More recently, the urgency of cooperation has been heightened by issues such as climate change and ensuring sustainable development, trans-national crime and the outbreak of diseases. Indeed, these are issues affecting Asia as a whole
and therefore requiring the concerted efforts of the wider Asia-Pacific Community to advance the goals of comprehensive and cooperative security. To this end, the regional body has thus far demonstrated its resolve by fashioning an ASEAN Community that will engage the major external powers in the Asia-Pacific region to further its developmental and as well empowerment goals.

In pursuing its regional integration agenda, ASEAN has opted for a constructivist approach, emphasising the building, and sharing, of norms; strengthening habits of consultation and cooperation; avoiding confrontation over contentious issues; and working towards peaceful resolution either within the ASEAN framework or through international arbitration.

In sum, while the concept of “ASEAN Way” in the context of Southeast Asian regionalism might appear frustrating and cumbersome (and especially so to outsiders), this consensus-based formula for strengthening intra-mural relations and building linkages with extra-mural powers has stood the test of time, promoted regional security and development, and is likely to influence regional security approaches and outcomes at the sub-regional level and for the greater Asian region. This consciousness of, and need for, a broader regionalism encompassing the wider Asia-Pacific was first expressed by the formation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 incorporating the ASEAN-Plus-Three countries and India, Australia and New Zealand. ASEAN’s role in promoting Asia-wide regionalism was also facilitated by its policy of constructive engagement with Dialogue Partners, thereby enhancing prospects for regional security, development and prosperity for the future.
ENDNOTES

1 France was a member of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed to contain Soviet Communist expansion in Europe. The U.S. felt obliged to support France as a NATO ally against communist expansion in Southeast Asia.


3 Konfrontasi is the Indonesian word for “confrontation”, meaning an intermittent war launched by Indonesia against Malaysia over the future of the island of Borneo.

4 ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines belonged to the U.S.-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; Malaysia had a defence treaty with Britain under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA); and Malaysia and Singapore were members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971) following the termination of AMDA. Indonesia under Suharto has pursued friendly political, military and economic relations with the United States since the fall of President Sukarno in 1966.


10 Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations: http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (date accessed: 1/10/09).

11 With respect to Myanmar, ASEAN justified Myanmar’s admission on the basis of respect for Myanmar’s sovereignty and non-interference in its internal affairs in spite of displeasure over the internal political situation in that country. See Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 112.


16 The CLVM countries are Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar, i.e. the former socialist states of Indochina and Myanmar, all of whom less economically developed than the original ASEAN members. They are referred to as the 2nd tier ASEAN members who joined the association well after the end of the Vietnam War.


23 However, India, Australia and New Zealand were included in the EAS as a result of pressure from Japan, Singapore and Indonesia, all three of whom opted for membership beyond ASEAN+3, while China, Malaysia and Thailand resisted the idea. See, Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism. Singapore, NUS Press, 2008, p. 141.
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